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SESSION FIVE: THE INTERSECTION OF
COMPARATIVE LAW METHODS IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROFESSOR MADS ANDENAS
am going to talk about the role of comparative law now and the role
of law in development. That leads to the question: What law? In
regard to the utility of comparative law, what is the role of law in law
reform? That sounds absolutely pathetic, "the role of law in law reform,"
but if you look at law reform projects, it is a very valid question. What is
the way to attach law, in a formal sense, to legal concepts? Is it some-
thing we just do to give effect to a policy? Is it anything more than that?
And we do not very actively use legal concepts. It is just giving form to a
policy. This creates serious problems.
We start by looking at a couple of more foundational concepts. You
spoke about the rule and you talked about the variations. Even so, you
have in many of the variations different meanings. It was very much
within the common law and perhaps within the United States traditional
rule of law. The Court of Justice, by the way, has a number of judgments
where it deals with the rule of law, and these are judgments from the
1990s. They come up with the judgments in all of the languages of the
European Union. In judgments where they use the rule of law, they do
not use just one translation. They give three or four translations. If the
judgment is in another language, they add this fourth translation as a
sense of comfort. And that is the way of acknowledging that we put very
different meanings into the concept of rule of law. I think that is an im-
portant basis. We have to recognize that even the most basic concepts we
are dealing with provide the basis for forms of law reform. We will find
that we put different meanings into law reform. Very often what we do is
discuss these terms as if they had the same meaning, which, of course,
they do not.
Let us look at a couple of more specific concepts. We can illustrate this
point, if we go into more technical legal concepts. Look at concepts such
as independence. What do we mean by independence? Even when I talk
about independence of the judiciary, we can find so many features of the
judicial system that, in one legal system, would be considered absolutely
essential to protect the independence of the bulwark of independence,
which is not present in another system. If we are looking at indepen-
dence of legal bodies, we can look at financial market regulations. You
are looking at independence of central banks, independence of national
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market regulators. Again, you will put different meanings into this in
different jurisdictions.
Now, you can move on and look at the concept of prudential regula-
tion. We can talk about prudential regulation in European Union law. It
is an area where there can be no national regulation. It is an area which
is reserved for community law organization. It is where member states
are left room to regulate-they have been left with regulatory freedom.
In the U.S. domestic concept, the context is also used. Prudential is used
to limit or expand, actually to define hetero jurisdiction in banking law.
You can look at this concept as a lender of last resort. These are technical
concepts with very different functions and very different meanings, de-
pending not only on what context it appears in but on which jurisdiction it
appears in. When we are dealing with these legal concepts, we have this
problem-we have this idea that law and legal concepts are there, that
they are the basis of law reform. On the other hand, we use our national
concepts, or, even if we are at the international level, we use the concepts
the way they are used, we believe, in our international jurisdiction, and
we assume that is universally applicable, which, of course, it is not. Now,
here you have a very important issue for comparative law.
All of this creates a very rich and fertile ground for comparative law.
But comparative law has not been able to pick up on this as an academic
discipline. Comparative law is in some kind of crisis right now. If ever
comparative law had a language as an academic discipline it does not
have it right now. Too much time is spent on discussing one's identity,
what comparative law is for, the method, and what the most fundamental
issues are. Now courts are, of course, important forum for comparative
law and they are the easiest starting point. Everybody who follows what
happens in the U.S. Supreme Court will enjoy the discussion about the
use of foreign law or international law in Roper v. Simmons. It is the
important recent decision, in which Kennedy, for the majority, makes use
of comparative law and international law sources. Justice O'Connor's
opinion could be seen as the most sophisticated opinion on the use of
comparative law. Even in this case, where she is not going with the ma-
jority, she builds up a kind of intellectual basis for refusing looking at
comparative law. Fairchild is an English case which is interesting because
the opinion applies the text in that case. This is an English House of
Lords decision about profession, a private law topic. It is a technical pri-
vate law topic with some public policy consequences, but it is nothing like
Roper v. Simmons. The same test for the use of comparative law is ap-
plied in that case, as Kennedy uses for the majority in Roper v. Simmons.
Remember that if you are the only country in the world with a particular
law, you have to undertake some real scrutiny of the rule you have in
international legal systems. If you are executing 16 to 18 year-olds and
nobody else in the world executes 16 to 18 year-olds, then perhaps you
have to look seriously and anxiously into whether this can be seen to
comply with basic principles. There is a very intense discussion about the
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way courts use comparative law and there is no unanimous decision on
that.
Now, law reform in comparative law is a different matter, particularly if
you are looking at legislation. We know that comparative law has many
active uses. It provides alternatives to choose from, and you can check
your compliance with international standards. It helps to avoid the dan-
ger in the international world of remaining bilatural. In most interna-
tional law contexts, we have our own jurisdiction. We are looking at our
compliance, our relationship with the international jurisdiction.
Whatever level they are at, there is this bilateral traffic between the one
jurisdiction and the international law or international practice. Compara-
tive law allows you, then, to look at compliance in other countries, which
is of great assistance when you are going to implement international stan-
dards. Another important function is, of course, that it provides empiri-
cal material as to consequences and effectiveness of different features of
a rule. All of this is highly problematic, but perhaps this providing of
alternatives to choose from is the most important practical use of compar-
ative law in the law reform context. However, there are many problems
there, as we will see in a little while. The question that still remains is, do
they work? Systemic and cultural conflicts, cultural values, cultural dif-
ferences are used as the major arguments against it.
That leads into another perspective, which is open and closed systems.
If you are looking at this in national law, comparative law is not a ven-
ture, because we have a closed legal system. We have authority. There-
fore it is not relevant, and does not provide us with any help if we make
use of it the way Kennedy does, as the majority does. We are actually
recognizing foreign law as a source, which it should not be. Kennedy and
the majority say it is not a source, but they still look at it. That is dishon-
est. You know, a typical Scalia way of approaching it. It looks very sharp
and intellectual but when you reduce it, you may doubt it.
Why do you close a legal system? It is interesting to look at. Looking
at Roman law, it has a relationship to common law, and it is starting to
look at the law as it is applied in the different local courts in the cities,
particularly the cities of northern Italy. And it is a very logical exercise.
You do not have to go very far before you see the need to close. If you go
up a couple of hundred years, and you look at Louis the Fourteenth of
France, he provides the basis for an absolutist monarchy and for much
more, sovereignty-very much national sovereignty. Louis establishes a
national monarchy which is not subject to any authority from the Hap-
sburgs. The idea is that legal sources outside a national system do not
have much weight. If you move on into the 19th century and, it continues
into the 20th century, it is very much a question of establishing a national
legal order which at some stage probably requires the closing of the legal
system-not recognizing sources outside the national system. It is a kind
of Scalia approach.
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It is not only a question of national legal systems that have to close.
Within the law, you find similar processes develop in most parts. The way
it was taught in European universities in the late 19th century, it is very
close to the emerging sociological tradition. When you start developing,
you have professors who were professors of law of state and economics of
state. Then, sociology started in the law faculties. And when you want to
establish public law, you take over private law matters to some extent and
you want to close down the relationship to the social sciences as they are
emerging. And that happened. So you have to close down law to the
influence from these different social sciences. Then, often you had to es-
tablish a method. You had to close down the relationship and revert back
to private law.
It is interesting to look at these kinds of processes. If you look at Tol-
stoy's War and Peace you see that he establishes general principles of
international law. He borrows extensively from the digests-the Roman
digests. He borrows from Roman law. He cannot recognize it because
that would somehow make the illegitimacy of his project apparent. It is
slightly difficult. So, he borrows, but he never acknowledges it. Actually,
there is a discussion where he hoped to deny his borrowing in any way.
So this kind of traffic happens, but when the system closes down, you do
not want to acknowledge you are borrowing for different reasons. It does
not mean that it does not continue. It is just that you do not acknowledge
it.
That leads us to the reasoning for opening it. In the period we are in
now, we have national systems that recognize the influence of interna-
tional law, and which have much more open law reform processes than
ever before, particularly in countries which are undergoing more funda-
mental reform. We recognize that we are borrowing, but the problem is
we do not really have much of a method for it. The interdisciplinary con-
text is very interesting. It is problematic for comparative law because
what is happening is that the law in context-the inclusion of social sci-
ence perspectives and empirical method beyond the normative-might
apply in this large prudential approach.
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